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Undeniably, one of the most significant current economic issues is
the role of Direct Foreign Investment ("DFI") in the continued develop-
ment of all nations, rich and poor. History has shown that successful
DFI requires a delicate balance between the investor and host country.
The emerging view (and one supported by the plethora of recently en-
acted or modified Foreign Investment Codes) is to seek only those invest-
ments from abroad which might be characterized as "beneficial" to the
host country.
From the perspective of many "First World" investors, a considera-
ble disparity exists between codified law and its interpretation and appli-
cation in the host country. Investment decisions based upon "rational
Western economic behavior," using modern financial data, by definition
require a reasonably certain world. Included in such decisionmaking
must be an assessment of the applicable laws and regulations of the host
country. If the aforementioned do not represent the manifested intent of
their drafters and implementers, Direct Foreign Investment may easily
go astray.
The United States of Mexico has addressed the question of Direct
Foreign Investment for many years. In doing so, Mexican policy regard-
ing foreign investment has ranged from very receptive to extremely nega-
tive, depending upon the administration in power and the state of the
* B.B.A. Miami, 1968; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1974. Associate Professor, Inter-
national Business Law, The University of Texas at Austin, Graduate School of Business.
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Mexican economy. Debt/Equity swaps are the latest vehicle for achiev-
ing Mexican political and economic goals. At present, the ultimate suc-
cess of the program remains to be determined. However, this latest plan
again points out the juxtaposition of law and its administration in the
everyday world. Mexican law may often be far removed from the reality
of its application. As a result, stated governmental goals and outside
investment targets often miss their mark. This Article attempts to ex-
plain how the interplay between law and its administration in Mexico has
had a significant impact on the country and its outside investors, particu-
larly in the case of debt/equity swaps.
I. DEBT/EQUITY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Recent Mexican executive and administrative policy, rather than
legislation, has allowed and encouraged foreigners to cancel Mexican
public and private debt by exchanging it for foreign equity ownership in
Mexican business. This type of debt/equity swap plan often allows for-
eign equity in a Mexican corporation to exceed 49% percent, a situation
which directly contravenes the general rule stated and, until 1984,
strictly enforced' in the Foreign Investment Law of 1973.2 As radical as
this may seem, it is consistent with Mexican economic and legislative
history, as well as the country's immediate needs. Mexico's oil boom and
subsequent bust, an aggressive international lending community, the
flight of pesos from Mexico into dollar accounts abroad, and the subse-
quent continuing devaluation of the peso have resulted in Mexico's econ-
omy being highly leveraged and unable to service the interest payments,
let alone the principal, on its debt.
Although Mexico's recent debt/equity swap program is designed to
facilitate the transformation of public debt into private investment, the
program should not be considered a total panacea for the ills that plague
that country. Rather, the debt-for-equity swap program is primarily in-
tended to attract the foreign investment necessary to revitalize the Mexi-
can economy and simultaneously reduce Mexican foreign debt.
Given its history, Mexico has understandably implemented such a
significant economic tool through administrative policy rather than
through legislation. This Article will briefly examine Mexico's law-mak-
ing history, focussing on its response to the country's economic condi-
tions and the presence of foreign investment. Next, the Article will
I NATIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMMISSION OF MEXICO, GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENT AND OBJECTIVES FOR ITS PROMOTION (1984)[hereinafter 1984 GUIDELINES].
2 Ley para pr6mover la inversion Mexicana y regular la inversion extrangera, Diario Oficial de
la Federacidn [hereinafter D.O.], Mar. 9, 1973 [hereinafter Foreign Investment Law].
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explore the growth of the Mexican debt/equity swap program and ex-
amine the plan's jurisdictional validity.
The policy supporting debt/equity swaps initially appeared in provi-
sion 5.11 of the Public Sector Debt Restructure Agreement, negotiated
by the Mexican government and its major foreign lenders. 3 Subse-
quently, several transactions occurred in which Mexican public debt was
exchanged for equity in Mexican enterprises. Later, in the Operating
Manual for the Capitalization of Liabilities and Replacement of Public
Debt with Investment, the Mexican Foreign Investment Commission
memorialized the goals for the debt/equity swap program and estab-
lished the necessary criteria to allow such a swap. Although this pro-
gram is not the result of legislation, it does fall within specific provisions
of the Foreign Investment Law of 1973 and within the spirit of the 1984
Guidelines for Foreign Investment.
II. HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN MEXICO
During President Porfirio Diaz's reign from 1876 to 1911, Mexican
leaders believed that a high level of capital investment in industries such
as mining and utilities would raise Mexico's economy to the level
achieved by the world's industrial giants. To attain this goal, the Mexi-
can government allowed foreign investment in Mexico, hoping that such
investment would stimulate industrial growth.4 The result was that out-
siders came to own more than half of the nation's wealth, and only the
handicraft and agriculture industries remained independent of foreign
control and domination.5 At the inception of the Mexican Revolution in
1910, it is estimated that foreigners owned more than 60% of the mining
industry and 25% of the land in Mexico.
6
The Mexican Revolution was partly a response to an economy dom-
inated by foreigners.7 "The causes of the Revolution were numerous,
conflicting and indistinct, but undeniable among them was the percep-
tion of many Mexicans that the foreign capitalism attracted by President
3 Provision 5.11 of the Public Sector Debt Restructure Agreement, found in the Operating
Manual, Manual Operativo Para la Capitalizacion de Pasivos y Sustitucion de Deuda Ptblica Por
Inversion, Operating Manual for the Capitalization of Liabilities and Replacement of Public Debt
with Investments, reprinted in J. Ritch, Foreign Investment in Mexico: The Mexican Public Debt
Capitalization Program, Presentation by Ritch to members of the law firm of Ritch, Rovzar y
Heather, S.C., Mexico City, February, 1987, at G-19 [hereinafter Operating Manual](on file with
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS), at exhibit A.
4 Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment: The Selective Promotion of Necessary
Industries, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 283 (1986).
5 H. WRIGHT, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO, 53 (1971)
6 Id. at 56, 59.
7 Id. at 60.
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Porfirio Diaz's administration was demeaning and oppressive." 8 Recov-
ery of Mexico's economic destiny was a principal goal of the Revolution.
The Constitution, a product of the Revolution, clearly reflected Mexico's
quest to control its own economic destiny. The document severely lim-
ited foreign ownership of land and restrained foreign economic activity.9
This policy has remained an essential tenet of every subsequent Mexican
administration. 10
The dynamics of this policy of restrained foreign economic activity
influenced each Administration's assessment of the state of Mexico's
economy. Legislation entitled "The Emergency Decree of 1944" ("The
Emergency Decree") granted extensive discretionary control over foreign
capital to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.1" The Emergency Decree
introduced restraints on the "creation, modification, liquidation and
transfer of stock"' 2 of Mexican companies containing any foreign owner-
ship. While the Emergency Decree, which applied only to companies
organized after its enactment, initially affected only a few companies, "It,
nonetheless, became the precursor of present legal restraints on foreign
investment in Mexico."' 3
Mexicanization of businesses dependent upon raw or intermediate
materials (e.g., Mexican share ownership of a corporation exceeding
50%) soon became necessary to procure the required import licenses.'
4
Additionally, businesses dependent on imports were strongly encouraged
to develop alternate domestic production. While still not required by
law, the Ministry of Foreign Relations insisted that businesses become
Mexicanized. 5
Despite the Emergency Decree, the general attitude toward foreign
investment seemed contrary to that of the Decree's underlying policy. In
fact, direct foreign investment in Mexico almost quadrupled between
1940 and 1965, totalling more than two billion dollars by 1969.16 At the
same time, however, pressure from Mexican industrialists, organized
under the Cdmera Nacional de al Industria de Transformacidn, to limit
the inflow of foreign capital, accompanied this increased foreign invest-
8 Murphy, Expropriation and Aftermath: The Prospects for Foreign Enterprise in the Mexico of
Miguel de la Madrid, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 431, 433 (1983).
9 CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LOS ESTADOS UNITOS MEXICANOS, art. 27 [hereinafter MEXI-
CAN CONSTITUTION].
10 H. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 63.
11 A. HOAGLAND, COMPANY FORMATION IN MEXICO, B-2 (1972).
12 Emergency Decree, D.O., July 7, 1944.
13 Maviglia, supra note 4, at 285, citing A. HOAGLAND supra note 11, at B-2.
14 A. HOAGLAND, supra note 11, at B-3.
15 H. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 87.
16 Id. at 93.
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ment. t7 Similarly, the government recommended the restriction of for-
eign investment and use of domestically produced intermediate materials
to stimulate import substitution. 8
In the early 1970s, the only legal restraints on the percentage of
foreign participation in industrialized activities resulted from the applica-
tion of the Emergency Decree of 1944 and the exclusion of private partic-
ipation, both domestic and foreign, in nationalized industries."
However, the government used other methods to discourage foreign
ownership. For example, the government discouraged foreign ownership
through the selective application of import controls and tax incentives.2
The Administration "seemed to prefer the flexibility in shaping its poli-
cies to individual investment projects that was allowed by the absence of
a general law on foreign investments" and adopted "specific statutory
restraints in selected industries as it felt the need ....
Although special laws had been enacted, the actual direction of the
Mexican government concerning foreign investment seemed a product of
internal policy decisions by the Ministry for Foreign Relations, acting
either on its own, with the concurrence of governmental agencies, or in
response to ad hoc private groups fearful of foreign competition. 22 For
example, between 1959 and 1965, the government attempted to displace
foreign investment by placing the telecommunications, petrochemical,
raw material and basic products industries on the 51% Mexican equity
list.23 Additionally, in 1966, the Ministry of Foreign Relations adopted
the policy of denying licenses for the foreign acquisition of majority in-
terests in existing Mexican companies.24
Mexican policy during the 1960s and early 1970s appeared to suffer
from a split personality. While certain statutes mandated the severe limi-
tation of foreign participation, the presence of foreign equity grew stead-
ily and rapidly. The application of foreign investment restrictions
seemed almost whimsical. Indeed, the inconsistencies between the actual
legislation and its administration were readily apparent.
17 Id. at 78.
18 Mavig!ia, supra note 4, at 287.
19 See generally H. WRIGHT, supra note 5.
20 Id. at 83-84.
21 Id. at 95.
22 Maviglia, supra note 4, at 287.
23 Id. at 287, n.42.
24 Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institution for Mexican Development: .4 Legislative History,
1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, at 197.
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III. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW OF 1973
The Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and for the Reg-
ulation of Foreign Investment ("The Foreign Investment Law") was en-
acted in 1973 and is presently the basic legislation regarding foreign
investment in Mexico.25 The purpose of this legislation was to codify
existing laws, regulations and policies. Also, the legislation established
the National Foreign Investment Commission, which could exercise sig-
nificant discretionary powers created by law, as well as the National Reg-
istry of Foreign Investment.26 The general rule established that foreign
investors could not hold more than 49% of new Mexican companies.27
This general rule is consistent with Mexico's desire to return to its Revo-
lutionary ideal of controlling its own economic destiny. Article 1 of the
Foreign Investment Law establishes that the law's objective is to stimu-
late a balanced and independent Mexican economy.
The Foreign Investment Law,2" the Technology Law,29 and the In-
ventions and Trademarks Law,30 re-affirmed the diminished role of for-
eign enterprise in the Mexican economy. Although these enactments
created controversy and resulted in a noticeable decline in foreign invest-
ment in Mexico, many were relieved that at least there appeared to be a
final codification on the subject. "Here at last, one thought, were the
rules to the game, rules that subsequent administrations might enforce
with varying nuances of strictness or indulgence, but predictable rules
nonetheless.
' 31
The Foreign Investment Law places all business activities in four
categories. The first concerns exclusively state-related business 32 the sec-
ond, Mexican Nationals, 33 and the third concerns foreign ownership lim-
ited to 49%. In the fourth category, percentages of foreign-owned equity
are administratively negotiable. However, foreign equity exceeding 49%
has been the exception rather than the rule. As a result, most foreign
investment in Mexico takes on the form of minority participation in a




29 Ley sobre el registro de la transferencia de tecnologia y el uso y la explotaci6n de patenetes y
marcas, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972.
30 Ley de invenciones y marcas, D.C., Feb. 10, 1976, reenacted with amendments as Ley sobre el
control y registro de la transferencia de tecnologia y el uso y explotaci6n de patentes y marcas, D.O.,
Jan. 1, 1982.
31 Murphy, supra note 8, at 440.




joint venture dominated by Mexican majority participants.34
The Foreign Investment Law set forth two major changes in the
restriction on foreign investment in Mexico. First, it established the 51%
Mexican ownership concept as a general rule. A foreign investor estab-
lishing a business with less than 50% foreign ownership need do no more
than register the business with the National Registry of Foreign Invest-
ment. Second, the Foreign Investment Law of 1973 limited foreign par-
ticipation in management to the proportion of foreign capital in the
business.35
A previously overlooked provision of the Foreign Investment Law
allows the Foreign Investment Commission to waive the 49% restriction
on foreign equity on a case-by-case basis.36 The Foreign Investment Law
vests the Foreign Investment Commission with broad discretionary
power to increase the maximum 49% foreign equity limit whenever it
deems the proposed project beneficial to the Mexican economy. The bur-
den is on the foreign-controlled enterprise to demonstrate that the pro-
ject will satisfy this goal, while proving that the economic independence
of Mexico is not threatened.37 However, "[s]ince the enactment of the
1973 Foreign Investment Law, exceptions to the 49-51% concept have
been granted rarely and only under special circumstances., 38 Thus,
although Article 8 of the Foreign Investment Law specifically allows for-
eign equity in a corporation to exceed 49%, the strict application of the
general rule appears to have created the illusion that majority foreign
equity in a corporation contravened the Foreign Investment Law. Fur-
thermore, the Foreign Investment Commission was at best elusive in set-
ting forth its operating criteria.39
In response to the mounting Mexican economic crisis, 1984 marked
Mexico's decision to implement the selective promotion of industries nec-
essary to stimulate its stagnant economy. In February, the Foreign In-
vestment Commission announced that it would apply the Foreign
Investment Law of 19734 with flexibility and would consider permitting
foreign capital investment of up to 100% in a significant number of activ-
ities-a shock to the international business community.41 In fact, the
34 Id.
35 Maviglia, supra note 4, at 290.
36 Foreign Investment Law, supra note 2, art. 8.
37 Id. at 292.
38 Id. at 293. Typically, majority foreign equity has been allowed in such industries as tourism,
advanced technology and priority industries. However, such allowance has been conditioned upon
the agreement eventually to Mexicanize.
39 Murphy, supra note 8, at 448.
40 Foreign Investment Law, supra note 2.
41 Maviglia, supra note 4, at 281.
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law had not changed at all; rather, the regulators had altered their appli-
cation of the law.
IV. 1984 GUIDELINES
Following a review of the Foreign Investment Law's application, the
Foreign Investment Commission acknowledged that it had not always
followed a systematic policy for the country's development, although an
adequate law existed for direct foreign investments.4 2 The 1984 Guide-
lines for Foreign Investment reflect the Mexican government's realiza-
tion that prior regulatory practices concerning foreign investment left
room for improvement. While foreign investment will continue to com-
plement domestic investment, the "policy will cease to be merely defen-
sive and [will] turn active and systematic, promoting the formation of
foreign investment alternatives, according to need derived from national
development priorities., 43 In discussing the Guidelines, Maviglia noted
that,
because its [Mexico's] foreign investment regulations are largely the result
of policy established by an administrative body with broad discretionary
powers, it has been difficult in the past to predict how favorably a prospec-
tive enterprise might be received. According to the Commission, however
... the criteria set forth in the National Industrial Development Plan, the
Foreign Investment Law and to the list of activities to be promoted under
the 1984 Guidelines and obtain a clearer indication as to the conditions to
which a company will be subjected and whether they are consistent with its
interests. 44
In the words of the Commission, "The primary objective of the 1984
Guidelines for Foreign Investment is the active, systematic and selective
promotion of foreign investment on specific activities considered the
most important for a 'fair and balanced growth of the Mexican econ-
omy.' "4' As further analyzed by Maviglia,
[w]ith respect to the 1984 Guidelines, that promotion is to focus on those
areas which will generate a positive foreign exchange balance, produce
competitive exports and import substitutions, contribute to national scien-
tific and technological development, advance Mexico's further integration
into the international community, involve large investments and create em-
ployment and geographical decentralization of industry.',
46
Interestingly, the Guidelines were not published in the Diario
42 Id. at 295, citing NATIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMMISSION OF MEXICO, FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENTS, JURIDICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION 12 (1984).
43 NATIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMMISSION OF MEXICO, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS, JU-
RIDICAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS APPLICATION 14 (1984).
44 Maviglia. supra note 4, at 304.
45 General Resolution of the Foreign Investment Commission, D.O., Aug 30, 1984.
46 Maviglia, supra note 4, at 304.
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Oficial, the official repository of all federal legislation. Rather, they were
published in all the major newspapers and distributed in pamphlet
form.4 7 The failure to publish the Guidelines in the Diario Oficial signi-
fied that the change was one of policy rather than of law.48 Even though
the Foreign Investment Law's allowance for exceptions to the 49% limi-
tation on foreign ownership is essentially only a general principle, "the
fact that the Foreign Investment Commission had strictly enforced that
limitation with few exceptions for the past eleven years had prompted the
erroneous belief that this policy was the law."49
A precursor to the Section 5.11 Restructure Agreements appears in
the 1984 Guidelines, which allow an increase in the percentage of foreign
equity in Mexican companies through the capitalization of debt which
may be granted for financially troubled industries on the list of national
priorities. However, these measures would only be available where an
increase in capital would be indispensable to the survival of the
company.5
V. ECONOMIC FACTORS LEADING TO THE DEBT/EQUITY
SWAP PROGRAM
The restrictive application of the Foreign Investment Law of 1973
produced a decrease in the flow of foreign currency into Mexico through
direct foreign investment. As a result, both the private and the public
sectors in Mexico increased their foreign borrowing. "Because of the re-
strictions on foreign investment, many private sector companies financed
expansions and purchases of foreign investors' interests with foreign cur-
rency loans."51
Compounding the problem was Mexico's role as a leading oil ex-
porter. Mexico's expectation that oil prices would continue to increase,
or at least remain constant, led Mexico to rely almost exclusively on oil
revenues as a source of repayment for foreign debt. 2 At the beginning of
the world oil slump, Mexico's 1981 petroleum related exports, projected
at $20 billion, yielded only $14 billion. 3 This drop contributed to the
47 Id. at 298-99.
48 Id. at 299.
49 Id. Although the 1984 Guidelines were not published in the D.O., the correlative resolutions
were. Id. at 299 n.128.
50 1984 Guidelines, supra note 1.
51 J. Ritch, Foreign Investment in Mexico: The Mexican Public Debt Capitalization Program,
Presentation by Ritch to members of the law firm of Ritch, Rovzar y Heather, S.C. Mexico City,
February 1987, at G-1.
52 Id.
53 Deane, The IMF and Latin America, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1982, at 12.
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$11 billion shortfall in the Mexican current account, which was, included
a trade deficit of $4 billion with the United States.54 Further, the world's
similar expectation of oil prices caused an aggressive international lend-
ing community to view Mexico as an attractive borrower. "As foreign
debt expanded and export earnings shrank, it became increasingly obvi-
ous that Mexico's external obligations were large not only in absolute
numbers but also in terms of Mexico's ability to pay."55 "Annual export
earnings in 1982 were less than half of the total debt principal and even
fell short of its annual debt service cost."
56
In 1982, because of high inflation in Mexico, peso-purchased dollars
fled Mexico in pursuit of relatively inexpensive United States products,
United States vacations and the United States dollar itself.57 On Febru-
ary 17, 1982, the Banco de Mexico ceased to support the previously
''managed float" in the dollar/peso market and allowed the peso to float
freely. As a result, the peso fell from twenty-seven to forty-five to the
dollar, fueling a further flight of dollars out of Mexico.58 On August 5,
1982, the Banco de Mexico again ceased to support the value of the peso,
and the currency fell from forty-nine to eighty-six pesos to the dollar.59
This foreign debt became increasingly burdensome as the pillars of
foreign investment over the years were whittled away. In 1910, foreign-
ers owned more than 50% of the Mexican national wealth.60 After the
expropriation of the principal oil companies in 193 8,61 foreign investment
fell to 8%.62 Foreign investment rose to 12% in the 1950s.63 However,
during the 1960s, foreign investment again declined to 10% of the na-
tion's wealth.6 This number dropped to 4% in 1981.65 By 1982, foreign
investment constituted only 3% of the national wealth.6 6 Further limit-
ing the supply of Mexico's lendable funds, President Jos6 Lopez Portillo,
by executive decree, expropriated Mexican private banks.67 The evolu-
54 Rudintsky, Why Maifana Came Early, FORBES, Mar. 15, 1982, at 33.
55 Murphy, supra note 8, at 10.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 11.
58 S. WISE & H. ORTIz DIETA, LA NACIONALIZACION DE LA BANCA (1982).
59 Murphy, supra note 8, at 11. The peso continued to fall in value against the dollar at a
precipitous rate. In fact, recent exchange rates have been approximately 2,500 pesos to the dollar,
giving the peso a value of almost 1/100th of that it once had.
60 H. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 53.
61 Id. at 60, 78.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 51.
65 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OVERSEAS Bus. REP. 81-09, May 1981, at 16.
66 Rout, Mexico's Leader Nationalizes Domestic Banks, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 2, col. 2.
67 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-48.
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tion of the Mexican economy has made it possible for a great number of
companies to obtain additional resources to carry out expansion or to
make payments of interest and principal on their foreign debt. These
companies have been filing requests for the capitalization of their foreign
debts through the mechanism of replacement of public debt with invest-
ment under Provision 5.11 of the Public Sector Debt Restructure
Agreement.
68
VI. DEBT/EQUITY SWAP PROGRAM NOT ENACTED
THROUGH LEGISLATION
In the context of Mexico's legislative, administrative and economic
history, it is understandable that Mexico has implemented a significant
economic tool such as the Debt/Equity Swap Program, not through leg-
islation,69 but rather by using available administrative powers to reshape
the rather malleable Foreign Investment Law of 1973. The Debt/Equity
Swap Program, although only a product of administrative policy and
procedure, finds its underlying authorization in the Foreign Investment
Law of 1973. According to the Operating Manual for the Capitalization
of Liabilities and Replacement of Public Debt with Investment, Article 8
of the Foreign Investment Law regulates the capitalization of debt.70
However, although Article 8 does extend to the Mexican government the
jurisdictional authority necessary to implement the Debt/Equity Swap
Program, it never specifically refers to any type of debt/equity swap
mechanism. Rather, Article 8 is the same provision allowing foreign
ownership. This provision reappeared and became the focus of the 1984
Guidelines for Foreign Investment when Mexico realized the necessity of
foreign investment to stimulate the economy. The first paragraph of Ar-
ticle 8 specifically referred to by the Operating Manual is the provision
permitting, with approval by the National Commission of Foreign In-
vestment, an enterprise to exceed the 49% limit on foreign ownership.71
Further, the Debt/Equity Swap Program responds to Mexico's eco-
nomic goals articulated in the 1984 Guidelines for Foreign Investment.
The thrust of these economic goals is to apply new schemes, within the
framework of the Foreign Investment Law of 1973, necessary to stimu-
68 Id. at G-19.
69 Maviglia, supra note 4, at 283. Typically, federal legislation is enacted by Congress which
rarely does more than give rubber stamp approval to the executive. The President promulgates the
legislation, by publishing it in the Diario Oficial de la Federacidn in order that the legislation be-
comes effective. Maviglia, supra note 4 at 283-84 (citing H. WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 16).
70 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-22.
71 Foreign Investment Law, supra note 2. Ley general de la deuda pfiblica, D.O. Dec. 31, 1976.
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late productive activity in Mexico.7" Thus, in the early 1980s, the Mexi-
can administration evaluated the state of the Mexican economic crisis
and decided to shed its policy of rigidly enforcing the 49% limitation on
foreign equity in Mexican enterprises.
This new policy emphasis, memorialized in the 1984 Guidelines for
Foreign Investment, was meant to stimulate an economy that, by the
mid-1980s, had drifted further towards economic destabilization. Thus,
Mexican officials again looked to the flexibility offered in the first para-
graph of Article 8 of the Foreign Investment Law of 1973 when creating
a debt/equity swap mechanism that could potentially attract foreign in-
vestment, technology and dollar accounts to Mexico.
Mexico's debt/equity swap mechanism originally materialized dur-
ing negotiations between foreign currency creditors, the Mexican govern-
ment and other Mexican public sector debtors concerning Mexico's
public sector debt. On September 8, 1984, acting through its Ministry of
Finance and Public Credit, Mexico informed the international banking
community of its plan to restructure Mexican public sector debt owed to
commercial banks maturing between 1985 and 1990. On August 19,
1985, the Mexican government and the foreign lending banks negotiated
new restructure agreements between the State of Mexico as Obligor
(Debtor), each Mexican Public Sector Obligor, Mexico as Guarantor and
the foreign lending banks.73 These negotiations resulted in the public
sector restructure agreement dated August 29, 1985.
What has in essence become law authorized jurisdictionally by Arti-
cle 8 of the Foreign Investment Law of 1973 and supported by the frame-
work of the 1984 Guidelines for Foreign Investment was originally
conceived by Mexican public sector debtors and the international bank-
ing community in an attempt to solve the Mexican debt crisis. This prag-
matic solution employs an administrative policy which weaves its way
through the jurisdictional framework and intent of prior law. The eco-
nomic pragmatism and political reality of this mechanism is best illus-
trated by the parties necessary to its livelihood. Each debt/equity swap
transaction must be negotiated by the business entities with a financial
stake in the debt as well as be authorized by the appropriate administra-
tive bodies. The debt/equity swap transaction necessarily involves an
agent of the relevant Mexican public sector (for example, Pemex), the
72 J. Alvarez Soberanis, Foreign Investment in Mexico Today, presentation by Alvarez Sober-
anis, General Director of Foreign Investment, Ministry of Industrial Promotion and Trade, to the
ABA Section of International Law and Practice, the State Bar of Texas Section of International
Law, and the Inter-American Bar Association in Houston, Texas, Oct. 9, 1987, at 16-17.
73 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-5.
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obligor, Mexico, and the foreign bank holding the credit. The debt/eq-
uity swap transaction also requires the governmental authorization of the
Mexican Ministry of Finance and Public Credit, the National Commis-
sion on Foreign Investment and the Ministry of Foreign Relations.74
The original restructure agreements depended as well upon Section
5.11, the basis for the Debt/Equity Swap Program. Section 5.11 is hid-
den in the Article of Agreements entitled "Other Payment Provisions" as
an exception to the requirements guaranteeing equal treatment of lend-
ers. Although "little attention was paid to Section 5.11 when the Agree-
ments were signed and no immediate action was taken to implement
them,"7" this provision is the basis for the current debt capitalization/
conversion program.
VII. MECHANICS OF SECTION 5.11
The debt/equity swap program is designed to convert Mexican pub-
lic sector debt into foreign private investment in Mexican companies.
The possibility of exchanging the rights of collection of the Mexican pub-
lic external debt into equity in public or private Mexican corporations
constitutes the key element of this mechanism.76 Provision 5.11 of the
Public Restructure Agreement states that, "all or a portion of the Credits
held by such Bank may be exchanged for qualified capital stock."7 7 This
transformation process cancels all or a portion of the Mexican public
sector debt in exchange for "Qualified Capital Stock." Section 5.11 sets
forth the steps of procuring a debt/equity swap:
Upon delivery of such Qualified Capital Stock by or on behalf of the Obli-
gor to. such Bank or its designee, (i) each Credit (or portion thereof) in
respect of which such Qualified Capital Stock is delivered shall cease to be a
"Credit" and "External Indebtedness" for all purposes of this Agreement
and the Obligor shall have no further obligation with respect to any such
Credit (or portion thereof) and (ii) the Obligor and such Bank shall deliver
to the Servicing Bank a correction notice reducing the principal amount of
such credit by the principal amount exchanged for such Qualified Capital
74 Mexican Capitalization Program, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1986, at 13. Each debt/equity
swap transaction is documented by an agreement "to be signed by the vendor bank, the foreign
investor and its Mexican subsidiary and the Mexican government in order to assure the foreign
investor the viability of its concrete operation." J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 23.
75 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-5.
76 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 18. Antecedents to the Mexican Debt/Equity Swap
Program were the programs legislated by Chile, Brazil and the Phillipines. See BANCO CENTRAL DE
CHILE, ADQUISICfON DE DEUDA EXTERNA, Ch.18; CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILLIPINES, PRO-
GRAM FOR THE CONVERSION OF PHILLIPINE EXTERNAL DEBT INTO EQUITY INVESTMENTS, 13
(1986).
77 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-8.
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Stock.7 8
Thus, Mexican public debt can be transformed into investment in Mexico
in the form of a security titled "Qualified Capital Stock".
An example of a debt/equity swap illustrates the procedures neces-
sary to satisfy the goals of this program. Assume that Ford Motor Cor-
poration ("Ford") wishes to establish a new wholly-owned subsidiary in
Mexico. 79  This new subsidiary, called Ford Mexicana, plans to export
90% of its production to the United States and will locate its plant in
northern Mexico. In addition, Ford Mexicana plans to employ state-of-
the-art technology using primarily Mexican raw materials. Such plans
satisfy Mexico's goals to attract high technology, increase exports and
foreign currency and decentralize industry away from Mexico City.8"
Because the proposed investment satisfies such criteria, the Mexican gov-
ernment would approve Ford's use of the debt/equity swap mechanism.
Thus, Ford would purchase one million dollars of Mexican public debt
from a United States bank at 60% of the face value of the debt.8 '
This debt would subsequently be transformed into $950,000 of capi-
tal invested into Ford Mexicana and $50,000 worth of pesos in cash.8 2
As a result of the capitalization, Ford would receive shares of stock equal
to the net payment in pesos.83 The Mexican subsidiary, Ford Mexicana
78 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-14. The mechanical aspects of a debt/equity swap closing consist
of the following:
1. Cancellation of Credits representing public sector foreign currency debt;
2. Delivery of peso proceeds of the cancellation to the Mexican corporation being capitalized
and the pesos are held by the Treasury of the Federation in the company's name bearing interest
at market rates, or used directly to satisfy domestic debts);
3. Issue by the Mexican corporation of Qualified Capital Stock represents the capital
contribution;
4. Delivery of the qualified Capital Stock to the foreign investor.
Note that although never specifically referred to, the nature of the debt/equity swap mechanism
probably qualifies the issue of the new "Qualified Stock" under an exemption from registration and
reporting requirements of the Mexican securities laws. See generally, Creel Carrera and Martin del
Campo y Souza, A Public Stock Offering in Mexico, 16 INT'L L. & POL. 305 (1984).
79 Based on example in J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 21-23. On May 23, 1986, a
Japanese automobile manufacturer, Nissan de Mexico, participated in the first debt/equity swap
transaction involving $54.5 million. Sesit, Nissan Raises Funds in Pesos by Buying Mexican Loans
Held in the U.S., Europe, Wall St. J., June 25, 1986, at 35, col. 1. Between May and December of
1986, sixteen transactions transpired involving $300 million. J. Ritch, supra note 52, at G-17.
80 Such policy will be discussed later in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 117-20.
81 The market price of the Mexican debt paper, of course, varies. For example, in August of
1986, Shearson Lehman Brothers International, Inc. valued such paper at $.56. During the third
quarter of 1987, Morgan Stanley placed the value at $.47-.48.
82 The discount percentage applied to the transaction will be discussed later in the article. See
infra notes 123-27.




must deposit these pesos in a Federal Treasury Account,84 and may only
use these pesos in investments approved by the Foreign Investment Com-
mission and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. 5 Subsequently,
the Mexican Government delivers the pesos directly to the subsidiary's
suppliers in payment for the goods and services which compose the debt/
equity approved investment.86
The debt/equity swap mechanism cannot be used to pay loans ob-
tained from foreign banks or to pay foreign parent companies of Mexican
subsidiaries, or to import machinery from outside of Mexico.87 Gener-
ally, the pesos cannot be sent abroad.88 "In this regard we believe that
the resources obtained through the mechanism must be used within the
country in order to reactivate the economy and preferably in new invest-
ment activities which will be carried out in Mexico."89 For example, the
mechanism can be used to pay Mexican suppliers, credits with Mexican
banks, or FICORCA (the Mexican trust for coverage of exchange rate
fluctuation).
IX. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEBT/EQUITY SWAP PROGRAM
The definition presently given to "qualified capital stock" necessar-
ily excludes Mexican companies and individuals from participating in the
debt/equity swap program. "Qualified capital stock" is defined as
capital stock of any Mexican public sector entity of Mexican private sector
company (i) which is issued in registered, certified form in the name of such
Bank or a Person designated by such Bank which is not a Mexican Entity
(as defined below), (ii) which is not transferable on the registration books of
such public sector entity or private sector company before January 1, 1998
90oto any Mexican Entity ....
"Mexican Entity" is defined as:
any Person who, in the case of an individual, is a resident of or, in the case
of an entity, has its principal place of business in the United Mexican
States.9 '
Thus, a Mexican national is not allowed to purchase Mexican public sec-
tor debt at a discount and convert such debt into equity ownership of a
Mexican enterprise. Obviously, this program on its face discriminates




87 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 19.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-48 (emphasis added).
91 Id.
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Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution, which provides that all individu-
als are entitled to equal treatment in the United Mexican States. 92 The
present Debt/Equity Swap Program certainly prohibits Mexican nation-
als and Mexican corporations from taking advantage of the low cost of
investment in Mexican companies through the cancellation of Mexican
public debt.
This prohibition against Mexican participation in the debt/equity
swap program was intended to prevent the occurrence of "round trip-
ping." Roundtripping occurs when pesos leave Mexico to purchase dol-
lars in the form of foreign debt and then return to purchase "cheap"
pesos as a form of investment. This prohibition has probably not been
entirely effective, as Mexicans can potentially circumvent this restriction
through the establishment or purchase of existing United States "shell"
corporations. Such United States "shell" corporations afford the Mexi-
can national a United States corporate identity and circumvent the
restriction.
On March 20, 1987, during negotiations for fresh money, the debt/
equity swap program was modified to legalize the possibility of allowing
Mexican nationals the option of participating in the swap mechanism.93
The Mexican government has not yet implemented this proposed modifi-
cation. 94 However, such a change would have important effects on the
Mexican economy. Most importantly, the provision would encourage re-
patriation of the Mexican money that has steadily left Mexico during the
economic crisis. Mexicans would be able to reinvest in their own compa-
nies and in their own country at a discount. Ironically, however, this
plan could seriously restrict the Mexican public debt presently available
to foreigners to convert into Mexican equity.
X. OPERATING MANUAL FOR THE CAPITALIZATION OF LIABILITIES
AND THE REPLACEMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT WITH
INVESTMENT.
Initially, the Debt/Equity Swap Program was implemented without
the publication of laws or regulations. The actual debt-for-equity trans-
actions negotiated by Mexican public sector debtors and foreign creditors
predated the promulgation of any type of government regulations on the
subject. - Eventually, rules developed as foreign banks and foreign inves-
tors approached the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit with pro-
posed rules. Ultimately, during July of 1986, the rules were embodied in
92 MEXICAN CONSTITUTION, art. 1.




the "Operating Manual for the Capitalization of Liabilities and the Re-
placement of Public Debt with Investment" ("Operating Manual" or
"Manual").95 This Manual was prepared by the National Commission of
Foreign Investment to facilitate the implementation of the debt swap
program.96 The official publication of a manual by an administrative
body is authorized by Article 19 of the Organic Law of Public
Administration.97
The Manual communicates the function of an administrative body
and coordinates the procedures necessary to employ such an administra-
tive agency. 98 Thus, the Operating Manual for the Capitalization of Lia-
bilities and the Replacement of Public Debt with Investment is
jurisdictionally authorized and has legal effect.
The. purpose of the Operating Manual is threefold. First, it places
the Debt/Equity Swap Program within the context of the Foreign Invest-
ment Law of 1973 and of Section 5.11 of the Restructure Agreements.
The Manual stresses that the Debt/Equity Swap Program fulfills the
spirit of the Foreign Investment Law and does not modify it.99 Second,
the manual describes the procedures for obtaining proper Mexican au-
thorization," informing the international and Mexican business com-
munities as to the structure and function of the administrative agencies
involved."1 Third, the manual sets forth the general priority industries,
export requirements, and geographic location for approval of a debt/eq-
uity swap transaction by the Foreign Investment Commission. 10 2 This
informs the business community as to the political and economic objec-
tives of the administrative agencies and thus, facilitates the application
process for both the business entities and the Mexican administrative
bodies. 103
XI. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE MANUAL
POLICIES, 1984 GUIDELINES AND THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW OF 1973
The Operating Manual clearly sets forth the jurisdictional umbrella
95 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-10.
96 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-19.
97 Ley orginica de la administracion pfiblica federal, D.O., Dec. 29, 1976.
98 Id.
99 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-10.
100 Id.
101 Manuales Administrativos. Guias Para Su Elaboraci6n. Colecci6n: Guias T6enicas. Serie
Organizaci6n y Mtodos No. 3, at 9 [hereinafter Manuales Administrativos].
102 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-10.
103 Manuales Administrativos, supra note 101, at 9.
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and administrative body which authorize the Debt/Equity Swap Pro-
gram. The Manual quotes from General Resolution 5, regarding the
Foreign Investment Law, "in the case that the relevant acquisition is pro-
posed through the capitalization of liabilities or are investment of profits,
the prior authorization of the National Foreign Investment Commission
will be required."'" 4
The Operating Manual establishes several of the Debt/Equity Swap
Program's objectives. Such objectives include reactivating the economy
through promotion of direct foreign investments, reducing the foreign
debt and aiding the financial problems of existing domestic enterprises.
As one Mexican official stated, "We are trying to show the world that
Mexico is facing its responsibilities and exploring possibilities with a
strong desire to get back into the right track."
10 5
The Debt/Equity Program's policy of selective promotion of indus-
try effectively complements Mexico's 1984 Guidelines for Foreign Invest-
ment. Both programs intend to direct foreign investment toward specific
areas considered vital to the reactivation of Mexico's economy. How-
ever, Mexico, now more than ever, recognizes its dire situation and its
competition among other debtor nations in attempting to attract foreign
investment. As one high-ranking official in the Foreign Investment
Commission noted, "Mexico is nowadays a prime target for D.F.I. and
my government has assumed a different attitude towards it."' 6
Mexico has positioned itself as a highly attractive target indeed.
Specifically, Mexico has gained entry into the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). This membership will open Mexico's
economy to external competition and will continue Mexico's efforts to-
ward economic liberation, i.e. removing laws which protect certain Mexi-
can-made products from foreign competitors.
Mexico views direct foreign investment as a possible complement to
the existing natural resources which can stimulate job creation, substitu-
tion of imports, generation of exports, technological development, and
aid in the improvement of Mexico's balance of payments.' 7 "The direct
104 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-22.
105 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 24. However, it is important to note that the Mexican
Debt/Equity Swap Program has been temporarily suspended due to the potentially extreme infla-
tionary effects that the program may have. The inflationary effect is caused by Mexico's merely
printing up the pesos necessary to capitalize the corporation. For example. it is estimated that every
one hundred million dollars of cancelled debt causes a 3-5% increase in the national inflation index.
106 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 7. For example, the Federal Executive power of Mex-
ico has created the Under Secretariat for Foreign Investments Regulation and Technology Transfer
as a branch of the Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development in order operationally to
support the National Development Plan.
107 Id. at 2-3.
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foreign debt conversion program is designed to promote direct foreign
investment in Mexico and at the same time, pay off in advance Mexico's
public foreign debt, without an outflow of foreign currency reserves." 108
Clearly, the Mexican government's outlook has not changed since the
1984 Guidelines were published; rather, Mexico has a developed an ag-
gressive attitude toward attracting foreign investment to Mexico.
Although this recent development strays from the policies of the 1970s
era of highly restrictive foreign investment, Mexico's current objectives
are still philosophically consistent with the Mexican Revolutionary goals
of the early twentieth century. The current Mexican administration still
strives to maintain Mexico's economic destiny through a highly regu-
lated program of attracting foreign debt through the conversion of the
public debt for equity."0 9
The policy followed in accepting majority-owned direct foreign in-
vestment through debt/equity swaps influenced the Guidelines for For-
eign Investment published in February of 1984, in the National Program
for Industrial Development and Foreign Trade of 1984-1988, and in the
new grouping of the General Resolution of the National Commission for
Foreign Investment. Clearly, the Debt/Equity Swap Program's intent is
to maintain its policy "[i]n compliance with the policy of selective pro-
motion of foreign investment included in the National Development Plan
and in accordance with Clause 5.11 of the Restructuring Agreement of
the Foreign Public Debt... ."0 The Foreign Investment Commission
will permit an increase in foreign investment only if the proposed trans-
action accords with the restrictions of the applicable laws and after a
careful analysis determines that the increase in the capital is indispensa-
ble to the survival of the Mexican enterprise."'
The National Development Plan of 1983-1988 includes a set of
guidelines to increase the share of technological, administrative and fi-
nancial resources from abroad necessary for Mexico's economic develop-
ment. 1 2 However, in accordance with Article 4 of the Foreign
Investment Law, the petroleum, electricity, railroad and basic pe-
trochemical industries remain 100% reserved to the State of Mexico.
11 3
The radio and television industries remain reserved to Mexican Nation-
als, 114 and the automotive parts industry must maintain at least 60%
108 Estrella, supra note 84, at 35.
109 Ollard, The Debt Swappers, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1986, at 69.
110 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-19.
I1 Id. at G-23.
112 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 4.
113 Operating Manual, supra note 3, at G-27.
114 Id.
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Mexican ownership.' 15
A. System of Priorities
The Manual regulating the debt/equity swap mechanism sets up a
system of priority industries, priority geographic locations, and priority
technologies to attract specific types of industry to specific regions of
Mexico. 1'6 Those debt/equity swap proposals that satisfy these criteria
are likely to gain the governing bodies' approval. Almost as important,
such proposals which satisfy certain criteria will reap greater financial
returns on the exchange of cancelled Mexican public sector debt for capi-
tal in the enterprise. For example, companies which, through exports,
will have a foreign exchange surplus in their balance of payments will be
characterized as having first priority for approval by the Foreign Invest-
ment Commission when considered for the debt/equity swap transac-
tion." ' Similarly treated are companies which will supply advanced
technology with their proposed projects.1 8 Also, products manufac-
tured with a high level of Mexican content fall into this category. Sur-
prisingly, debt/equity swaps resulting 100% foreign ownership may also
receive consideration as a first priority proposal.'1 9
In a General Resolution issued by the National Commission of For-
eign Investment during November 1986, Mexico expressed its policy to-
ward attracting small and medium-sized foreign-based enterprises
through the debt/equity swap mechanism.1 20 For example, businesses
which employ between 250 and 500 employees (and satisfy other crite-
ria) 1 2' will not require authorization from the Commission of Foreign
Investment. The Mexican Administration's rationale is that small and
medium-sized businesses typically serve as the technological vehicles for
the large, multinational corporations. Because of their smaller size, these
businesses will need Mexican management. Also, due to their smaller
political leverage, these companies will be unable to mandate that the
technology at some point leave the country. Thus, again, the present
Mexican Administration is attempting to reactivate the economy
through the selective promotion of certain types of enterprises granted
priority status through the debt/equity swap mechanism.
Also, the use of future proceeds by the enterprise will similarly aid
115 Id.




120 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 9.
121 Id. at 10.
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in determining which level of priority the proposed debt/equity swap
transaction will receive by the Commission of Foreign Investment. For
example, capital invested in Mexican fixed assets, payment of peso debt
to Mexican banks and payment of peso debt owed to FICORCA will
prioritize the debt/equity swap transaction at the highest level.122 The
purpose of such selective promotion is obvious: Mexico does not want the
proceeds generated by this mechanism to be used to purchase foreign
exchange, which would defeat the purpose of the program.
B. Application of Discount
The discount percentage applied to the debt/equity swap transac-
tion is the number of pesos that will be used to capitalize the target com-
pany per United States dollar of Mexican public debt cancelled.12 3
However, the percentage number is actually the percentage that will be
subtracted from one hundred percent of the value of the cancelled foreign
debt in pesos. Thus, the lower the percentage, the greater the value to
the foreigner.
The discount negotiated by the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit is used to promote selectively certain types of industry to certain
geographic locations in Mexico.124 The higher the priority of the use of
funds, the lower the discount. The Operating Manual states that, "(t)he
percentage of discount at which the Mexican government or other public
debtor entities shall redeem their debt shall be fixed in accordance with
the benefits that the transaction implies for the development of the
country." 
125
The discount percentage to be applied varies from 0-25%. For ex-
ample, a 5% discount will be applied whenever the new corporation or
the already existing one will export 80% or of the new production and
will aid in the surplus of its balance of payments.1 26 A zero discount




The Mexican Debt/Equity Swap Program, like the 1984 Guidelines
122 Operational Manual, supra note 3, at G-11.
123 Id. at G-13. Once the discount has been applied, the amount of pesos to be delivered is
determined by averaging the free rates of exchange of three Mexican exchange houses. Id. at G-30.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 J. Alvarez Soberanis, supra note 72, at 20.
127 J. Ritch, supra note 51, at G-12.
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for Foreign Investment, presents the illusion that such a program has
been thoughtfully promulgated by the legislature. In fact, the debt/eq-
uity swap mechanism is more of a pragmatic solution hammered out by
parties attempting to avert an economic crisis. This mechanism was
eventually supported by the publication of the Operating Manual, a me-
morialization of the administrative policy of the Foreign Investment
Commission. The Operating Manual, which was granted legal validity
under Mexican administrative law, explains the policy and mechanics of
the Debt/Equity Swap Program. In addition, it points to the jurisdic-
tional foundation for such a program, Article 8 of the Foreign Invest-
ment Law. Most important, the Operating Manual clearly sets forth that
the Debt/Swap Program is a continuation of the 1984 Guidelines' policy
to attract foreign investment to Mexico through application of the once-
shrouded foreign investment law exception allowing foreign equity in a
Mexican corporation to reach majority interest.
In sum, the debt equity swap is but one further example of the
machinations that one finds in the interplay between the stated law and
its administration in the Mexican legal system. However, it is fair to say
that the recent economic difficulties have forced a greater union between
law and policy which must ultimately be to the benefit of Mexico and
those investing in its future.
